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 Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science. By John S. Dryzek.
 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Pp. x, 254. $39.50 cloth.)
 In just more than 220 pages of text, John Dryzek has effectively and provocatively
 addressed a remarkable number of problems important to the discipline of politi-
 cal science and to United States and international political practice. Drawing on
 and synthesizing an extensive array of contemporary works, including several of
 his own published articles, Dryzek's aim is nothing less than "a coherent, integra-
 tive, and attractive program for politics, public policy, and political science" that
 "looks forward to a world of free and congenial political interaction" (ix), in the
 face of "widespread pessimism about the possibilities for effective public policy"
 (3). This normative program, termed "discursive democracy," combines elements
 of the classical Greek notion of the polis with strong participatory democracy,
 communicative rationality in problem solving, and critical theory.
 The problems and crises faced by citizens, policy analysts, and political sci-
 entists in the contemporary world have a common cause according to Dryzek's
 diagnosis-the postenlightenment hegemonic development of instrumental ratio-
 nality and objectivism. Instrumental rationality dominates the political economy
 and has colonized Jurgen Habermas's "lifeworld"; it is antidemocratic, repressive,
 too narrow to address the increasing complexity of social problems, and undercuts
 the ability of political science to be truly scientific and critical. Objectivism, or the
 idea that all choices about fact and value should be made through appeal to a set of
 objective standards, leads to adoption of a false model of science which is also po-
 litically repressive and constrains the "progress" of political science.
 The common cure for these political and professional problems is the aban-
 donment of objectivism as an ideal and the deployment of communicative ratio-
 nality, or "uncoerced and undistorted interaction among competent individuals,"
 as a limitation on instrumental rationality in politics, public policy, and political
 science. Dryzek adopts Habermas's concept of communicative rationality and
 argues convincingly that something like Benjamin Barber's strong participa-
 tory democracy is the political form most compatible with the resulting mix of
 instrumental and communicative rationality. In such a system, policy analysts and
 political scientists would be participants and facilitators rather than technocratic
 elites, and the policy process would become "pedagogical, discursive, concerned
 with public rather than private ends, and demanding in terms of active citizen-
 ship" (119).
 Dryzek argues that the contemporary discipline of political science, because of
 its adherence to a "scientific" methodology based in instrumental rationality and
 epitomized by the opinion survey, winds up reinforcing the dominant discourse of
 society and legitimating the status quo. The use of opinion surveys (and perhaps
 multiple-choice exams?) functions "in a particularly subtle and unexpected way to
 reinforce a prevailing political order of instrumental domination and control,
 which treats mass politics in terms of individuals who are mostly passive and only
 occasionally and minimally disposed to participate to political life" (153).
This content downloaded from 131.95.218.41 on Wed, 14 Jun 2017 15:21:36 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 546 Book Reviews
 The critical argument of the three chapters on political science will be familiar
 to any professional political scientist who has been at least minimally alert during
 the methodological debates of the past 35 years, but Dryzek's proposed remedy
 may not be so familiar. Dryzek proposes Qmethodology, as developed by William
 Stephenson and Steven R. Brown, as an empirical, quantitative, and interpretive
 technique for the study of social and political life that is consistent with his ideas
 on communicative rationality and critical theory; and he discusses a variety of in-
 teresting applications of Qby himself and others that he thinks merit the "tenta-
 tive approval" of the technique. More broadly, in order to become policy relevant
 in modern conditions of conflict and complexity, political science must adopt the
 canons of communicative rationality, be more tolerant of diverse research tradi-
 tions, and dedicate itself to "multifaceted and relentless critique" (221) in order to
 facilitate the emergence of discursive democracy.
 Dryzek argues strongly that discursive democracy, with its critical theory and
 communicative rationality, is ultimately preferable in terms of both political prin-
 ciple and policy effectiveness to its feasible alternatives. The currently hegemonic
 political system of instrumental rationality is clearly hierarchical, authoritarian,
 and technocratic. The most attractive alternative, the "critical rationalism" of Sir
 Karl Popper's "open society," with its ideals of policy experimentation, piecemeal
 social reform, and liberal democratic polyarchy is shown to be based on a prob-
 lematic narrow view of human nature and to depend ultimately on a governing
 elite of scientific manipulators. Neither the administrative state of instrumental
 rationality nor the liberal polyarchy of critical rationalism is capable of dealing
 with the complex social problems facing the modern polity. Only the reasoned
 consensus on public problems and their solution produced by the egalitarian and
 communicatively rational processes of discursive democracy is likely to moderate
 the increasing conflict of modern political life.
 In a discipline long on description and critique and short on remedies, Dryzek's
 book is a refreshing change. He combines abstract conceptual and philosophical
 diagnosis with specific curative recommendations. A common criticism of critical
 theory is that it is overly abstract and concentrates on critique to the exclusion of
 remedies, and Dryzek addresses this lack with his idea of "discursive design."
 Briefly, discursive designs are social institutions "around which the expectations
 of a number of actors converge" (43) and which therefore serve as sites of commu-
 nicative interaction. "Individuals should participate as citizens, not as represen-
 tatives of the state or any other corporate and hierarchical body." No one is
 excluded, and some processes might be devised to make sure that everyone with
 an interest in an issue is included. A discursively designed structure is problem
 specific, nonhierarchical, free of formal rules, operates by consensus, and consti-
 tutes "a public space within which citizens associate and confront the state."
 Dryzek's cogent discussion of the requirements of discursive designs appropriate
 to a communicatively rational political and policy process is a real contribution to
 the literature of critical theory, which in the past has relied on idealized abstrac-
 tions or vague remedial notions such as "new social movements."
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 Dryzek argues that discursive democracy is not a utopian ideal (though it is
 premised in a counterfactual ideal speech situation and a nonexistent public
 sphere). He finds real-world approximations to discursive democracy in the
 "incipient discursive design" of dispute mediation processes in labor, environ-
 mental, and other fields; processes of "informal justice"; regulatory negotiation;
 and problem-solving workshops. Though these processes are all subject to various
 forms of manipulation and cooptation, Dryzek believes that their use is growing,
 and that the complexity of the modern world facilitates the development of dis-
 cursive designs.
 Discursive Democracy is clearly written and remarkably free of jargon for a book
 addressing such complex conceptual and philosophical issues. It is an appropriate
 supplementary text for advanced undergraduate courses in policy and social sci-
 ence methods, and it should be required reading for graduate students in political
 science.
 Edward M. Wheat, University of Southern Mississippi
 Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform. By James S.
 Fishkin. (Yale University Press, 1992. Pp. 133. $17.95 hard.)
 James Fishkin's book, Democracy and Deliberation is a contribution to an increas-
 ingly important avenue of inquiry in democratic theory: the attempt to provide an
 adequate account of democratic political judgment and the contexts in which such
 judgment may be exercised. This task is especially daunting at present since the
 very structure of large democratic states seems to discourage the realization of some
 form of genuine democratic deliberation. Fishkin tries to resolve this dilemma by
 showing that even in a large state, any defensible justification for democratic
 equality must also include access to democratic deliberation. This argument will
 serve as the basis for a rather forceful criticism of contemporary liberal democratic
 politics as well as providing a justification for his by now rather well-known pro-
 posal for a "deliberative public opinion poll."
 Although Fishkin's book is explicitly meant to advance his practical proposal for
 a "deliberative public opinion poll," it largely rotates around his critical account of
 democracy. Fishkin's criteria for a defensible justification for democracy, though a
 bit thin, seem on the surface eminently sensible. Any defensible justification of
 democracy must minimally realize for its citizens political equality, opportunities
 for deliberation, and protection against majority tyranny. Of these three features
 of democracy the first and most basic for Fishkin is political equality. All other
 ends must be instrumental to this one. At the very least this requires that each
 person's vote must count equally, which means each citizen must have an "equal
 probability" to determine the outcome of an election. But, on Fishkin's account,
 political equality is more than this. It also requires that socioeconomic inequalities
 not impinge upon political participation and above all, that all significant interests
 that command a following get an "effective hearing" (31-33). The problem with
This content downloaded from 131.95.218.41 on Wed, 14 Jun 2017 15:21:36 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
